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In Retrospect of 40 Years, Another Look at Andrews’
Personal Deductions Argument:
A Comparison of Charitable Contributions
and Child-Care Expenses
Limor Riza*
INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I would like to compare two major types of expenses
– charitable contributions and child or dependent care expenses – to
determine whether they should be deducted from gross income.  Al-
though these two expenses have common ground, they are also funda-
mentally dissimilar.  Both expenses are not strictly “private” since
they have a normative aspect.  Moreover, as suggested by William An-
drews in his classical article, Person Deductions in an Ideal Income
Tax, we should not ignore the use side of the economic equation,
which is also relevant to both.1  Nevertheless, in this Article, I claim
that similar treatment of both expenses ignores the income production
process, leaving us with a flawed and incoherent tax system.
Andrews discusses some personal expenses that should be excluded
from taxable income.  He examines the ideal personal income tax with
regard to the taxation of personal deductions, and finds the conven-
tional tax expenditure analysis lacking2 in that it disregards the uses of
income as opposed to its sources.3  His main argument is that taxable
income should be defined by the former, rather than the latter, to pre-
vent the distortion of pretax equality and that the examination of uses
facilitates an ideal discussion of personal income tax.4  A fair distribu-
tion of tax burden is one that takes both consumption and accumula-
tion into account.5  The significance of Haig-Simon’s6 formula,
according to money cash definition, lies not so much in the taxpayer’s
* Limor Riza, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Carmel Academic Center.  Paper presented at
the University of Chicago, 7th National Business Law Scholars Annual Conference (NBLSC).
1. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309,
313 (1972); see infra Chapter II (elaborating on this discussion).
2. Id. at 312.
3. See id. at 313, 317, 320 (emphasis added).
4. See id. at 316, 328.
5. See id. at 316.
6. See infra Chapter II.
55
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“participation in the production sector”7 but rather in the “distribu-
tion sector”8 whereas the tax system has a distributive goal.9  Al-
though the argument may be somewhat tautological,10 “deduction
should be allowed whenever money is expended for anything other
than personal consumption or accumulation. And that, arguably, is the
intrinsic role of personal deductions.”11  He believes that the justifica-
tion of deductions “is intrinsic to the elaboration of an ideal personal
tax base.”12
Andrews illustrates his argument with medical expense and charita-
ble contribution deductions.  He rationalizes the deductions of those
expenses differently,13 despite the fact that the starting point of both is
focused on the use side.  His main argument for allowing medical ex-
pense deductions and excluding them from the tax base is largely dis-
tributional.14  Contribution to charity, on the other hand, is not
consumption and thus should be deductible since it is dedicated to
third parties and not to the private use of the donor-taxpayer.
Andrews’ position is interesting in several respects.  First, its base-
line is that the tax system should have some intrinsic objectives.15  As
discussed below, I believe we should strive for a coherent and consis-
tent system though Andrews’ work does not provide us with a one.16
The second, and more important and appealing, aspect of his work is
the focus on the use side of the economic equation.  This focus draws
various “normative” expenses into the tax system, thus apparently in-
troducing extraneous principles, such as redistribution.  Indeed, the
following analysis argues that taxation serves two purposes beyond
raising revenue: regulatory and redistributive.  I do not object to tax
incentives for these two purposes; but, by focusing on the use side and
somewhat neglecting the income production side, Andrews fails to
7. Andrews, supra note 1, at 324. R
8. Id. Andrews continues, “[a]nd when we say income is to be taxed in whatever form re-
ceived, it is the latter relation, not the former, that we should seek to refine.” Id.  For an elabo-
ration see id. at 327.
9. Id. at 326.
10. Andrews starts his claim by saying that “either that thought is circular since it effectively
defines consumption in terms of income or it represents reversion to other senses of income —
income as cash receipts or income as compensation.  If we take literally Simons’ specification
that income is to be defined in terms of consumption and accumulation, then a deduction should
be allowed whenever money is expended for anything other than personal consumption or ac-
cumulation.  And that, arguably, is the intrinsic role of personal deductions.” Id. at 325.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 315.
13. Andrews, supra note 1, at 375. R
14. Id. at 337.
15. Id. at 312.
16. See infra Chapter V.
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provide us with a coherent and consistent doctrine.  In order to main-
tain a comprehensive tax base, we should allow deductions that do not
ex ante disregard17 the income production side of the economic equa-
tion.  Since Income equals Consumption plus Savings, Andrews shifts
the focus to Consumption, which by a simple arithmetic equals In-
come minus Savings.18  Prioritizing income over consumption and sav-
ings has no relevance in Andrews’ work.  To achieve a more coherent
tax system, I would limit Andrews’ determination that “deduction
should be allowed whenever money is expended for anything other
than personal consumption or accumulation”19 by adding “and any-
thing related ex ante to income production.”
The methodology of this Article is to examine whether those ex-
penses that have a normative aspect of altruism, such as dependent
care expenses or charitable contributions, fall in line with the three
goals of taxation: revenue raising, regulatory, and redistributive goals.
Only expenses that serve all three purposes help maintain a coherent
tax system.  A comparison of the two types of expenses shows that by
virtue of an expense’s normative aspect, both expenses promote redis-
tribution and regulatory objectives.  The discussion hitherto is analo-
gous to Andrews’ argument.  But the difference occurs when we refer
to the first objective that requires us to tackle the deduction issue
from both sides of the equation – use and source.  A mixed expense
comprising an altruistic normative component, such as child or depen-
dent care, is one that connects the revenue side to its uses and weighs
the use and source sides equally.  Conversely, other normative ex-
penses that are not prerequisites for income production should not be
deductible.  The ex ante and ex post discussion is a fundamental dif-
ference between these two normative expenses, which disregards An-
drews’ view.  This link between the income and its uses promotes the
three goals of taxation concurrently, making for a more coherent tax
system.
The Article is comprised of seven chapters.  Chapter I introduces
the practical law concerning the allowable deductions and the defini-
tions of mixed business and personal expenses.  In Chapter II, I briefly
examine the meaning of income.  Chapter III focuses on the law appli-
cable to the two expenses at stake: charitable contributions and child-
care expenses.  Chapter IV briefly reviews the literature on both ex-
17. Andrews does not completely disregard sources, but since he considers sources equal to
uses he focuses on the latter. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 375; see generally Edward J. McCaf- R
fery, Tax’s Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 79 (1996).
18. McCaffery, supra note 17, at 80.
19. Andrews, supra note 1, at 325 (emphasis added). R
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penses.  In Chapter V, I elaborate on the three goals of taxation and
the need for a coherent tax system.  Chapter VI characterizes the ex-
penses at stake: their common altruistic aspects and the important dis-
tinctions between them.  Finally, Chapter VII analyses those expenses
according to the tax goals while keeping their distinctive aspects in
mind.  I end this Article with some conclusions.
I. ALLOWABLE DEDUCTION AND THE PROBLEM OF MIXED
BUSINESS AND PERSONAL EXPENSES
A. Allowable Deductions: Definition
Every business has to pay taxes on its net income, i.e., that remain-
ing after deducting allowable expenses from its revenue.  In many in-
stances, it is clear which expenses should be deducted.  For example, if
the business at stake is a shoe workshop, it is clear under I.R.C. § 162
that raw materials, electricity bills, and salaries are deductible since
they are “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on”20 the shoe business.  This is based on the
essential principle that deductible expenses are related to the taxable
activity.21  Thus, the expense should be characterized as both “ordi-
nary and necessary.”  Treasury Regulation 1.212-1(d) defines “ordi-
nary and necessary” expenses as “reasonable in amount and [bearing]
a reasonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of
taxable income.”22  Courts have developed a more accurate definition
than the statutory terminology:23 “An ‘ordinary’ expense is one that is
‘normal, usual or customary . . .’”24 whereas necessary is interpreted
by courts as “appropriate and helpful.”25
B. Mixed Business and Personal Expenses
When the expense is considered private it is not deductible.  Section
262(a) specifically disallows deductions for “personal, living, or family
expenses.”26  A purely private expense which does not contribute to
20. I.R.C. § 162(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254) (effective Dec. 19, 2014).
21. For a comparative analysis see, for example, HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COM-
PARATIVE INCOME TAXATION; A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 249 (2010) and Joseph A. Pechman &
Gary V. Engelhardt, The Income Tax Treatment of the Family: An International Perspective, 43
NAT’L TAX J. 1 (1990).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(d) (as amended in 1975).
23. See, e.g., Melinda L. Reynolds, Redlark v. Commissioner: A “Bird in the Hand” for Non-
Corporate Taxpayers?, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 751, 755 (1997).
24. Curcio v. Comm’r, 689 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S.
488, 488 (1940)).
25. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
26. I.R.C. § 262(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254).
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income production and its deduction is prohibited would be, for exam-
ple, a dentist, who works outside his home, buys flowers to decorate
his private living room.  The rationale is that it does not promote the
progressivity of tax, erodes the tax base, and is inequitable.27
Sometimes expenses have a mixed character, partly personal and
partly income-producing.  To put it somewhat differently, they carry
both an “income-produc[ing] and a consumption dimension[s].”28
The distinction between personal and business expenses is not always
clear, of course.  A common example is travelling expenses as travel
may be significantly work-related and at the same time also produces
some self-benefits.  Another example is a loan where 70% is used for
one’s business and 30% is spent on a family vacation.29  In this case,
the taxpayer may deduct 70% of the interest paid for his business but
the remaining 30% may not be deducted.  Further, a dentist who buys
the National Geographic journal for his personal use and subse-
quently places it in his clinic’s waiting room, is another example of a
mixed expense.30
Each country has developed different rules in this matter.31  In Ger-
many, for example, mixed business expenses are not deductible unless
explicitly considered deductible by law.32  The rationale underlying
this prohibition is based on tax equity principles.33  Some special pri-
vate expenses (Sonderausgeben)34 such as alimony payments and
church tax payments or some specific extraordinary expenses
(außergewo¨hnliche Belastungen)35 are allowed.36  Note, the extraordi-
nary expenses are private expenses that the taxpayer is either legally,
factually, or morally unable to avoid.37
The separation between business and private expenses is based on
the obsolete “separate spheres theory” developed in the nineteenth
27. Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions - A Tax “Ideal” or Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 L.
REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 1, 3-4.
28. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 250.
29. IRS, DEPT. TREASURY, PUBLICATION 535 BUSINESS EXPENSES (2017), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p535.pdf.
30. See Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REV. 925, 952 (1976).
31. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 250. R
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Law], Oct. 8, 2009, BGBL. I at 3366, § 10-
10i (Ger.).
35. Id. § 33, 33a.
36. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 74. R
37. EStG [Income Tax Law], § 33(2).
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century.38  This theory distinguishes between two separate spheres:
male and female.  The idea behind this separation is that men belong
to the market, or public sphere, and women belong to the family-pri-
vate sphere.39  As opposed to the family sphere, the market is consid-
ered productive.40  The related dichotomy between business and
private expenses is thus obsolete and inconclusive, and it must, there-
fore, be reviewed and reformed.
However, what if the expense is not merely economic, but involves
a normative aspect or has some private component that is not merely
“personal consumption,” as in Andrews’ terminology, but has norma-
tive value?  Imagine that the shoe workshop employs disabled persons
and pays them a salary that is not commensurate with their actual
productivity out of charity.  Or assume a somewhat different example,
where a self-employed person employs a nurse to care for a sick rela-
tive in order to be able to go on working and producing higher in-
come.  Sometimes a normative expense takes a different form, as
argued below, where for example, the self-employed businessman do-
nates some money to charity.
This Article focuses on two normative expenses: child-care, and also
similarly dependent care, and charitable contributions.
II. WHAT IS INCOME?
Following Andrews,41 prior to discussing allowable deductions one
must first understand the economic definition of income.  The tradi-
tional Schanz-Haig-Simons formulation states that Income equals the
sum of Consumption and Change of Savings in a certain period, usu-
ally, a calendar year.  This formulation applies a comprehensive tax
base since it measures the growth in individual wealth within the cal-
endar year.  It implies that expenses incurred to produce income can
be deducted to obtain the net income.  Taxation is levied on net in-
come and not on gross income. Thus, revenue-raising income taxation
taxes the net income by including all gross income and “deducting all
the expenditures associated with the production of that income.”42
38. Assaf Likhovski, Chasing Ghosts: On Writing Cultural Histories of Tax Law, 1 U.C. IR-
VINE L. REV. 843, 847 (2011).
39. For example, the private sphere would include child raising and domestic activities. See
e.g., Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498-99 (1983).
40. Id. at 1498, 1500-01.
41. See e.g., Andrews, supra note 1, at 328. R
42. Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget
Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C.L. REV. 679, 683-84 (1976).
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Income may have other definitions.  It can be a recurring cash re-
ceipt from a certain source, compensation for use of capital or net
accretion from whatever source.43  Although it serves as an anchor in
many tax laws, even if not adopted per se, the economic definition
involves some practical and perhaps theoretical quandaries.  For in-
stance, some scholars criticize it for its ambiguous terminology and for
ignoring distributive goals.44
III. APPLICABLE LAW: TAXATION OF CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DEPENDENT CARE IN US
Charitable contribution and dependent care are private expenses
which, according to I.R.C. § 262(a), are not deductible.  Though,
American tax law treats those payments differently.  Under § 170, any
corporation or individual may deduct donations to qualified charities,
subject to some restrictions.  For example, the allowed deduction
amount is restricted,45 in addition to some restrictions concerning the
type of charity and property donated.
As early as 1939, in Smith v. Commissioner,46 child-care payment
was considered by courts as a private expense.47  In this case, the tax-
payers, working parents, requested a deduction for employing a nur-
semaid to care for their child while they were working.  The court did
not accept the “but for” test48 and held that daycare payments are not
deductible since they are mainly “personal in their nature.”49  This old
verdict was reinforced also with regard to dependent care expenses in
43. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 318-20. R
44. See e.g., Dodge, Joseph M., Deconstructing the Haig-Simons Income Tax and Reconstruct-
ing It as Objective Ability-to-Pay ‘Cash Income’ Tax 1 (Fla St. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Re-
search Paper Series, Paper No. 633, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2245818## (Click on “Download This Paper” icon for access to the working paper).
45. In general, any individual is allowed to deduct 50% of his adjusted gross income. See
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2012).  But sometimes the amount of deduction is lower. See e.g., I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(1)(B)-(D).  A corporation, however, may deduct no more than 10% of its taxable in-
come. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A).
46. Smith v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039-40 (1939).
47. For historical legislation developments on childcare tax treatment see Wendy Gerzog
Shaller, Limit Deductions for Mixed Personal/Business Expenses: Curb Current Abuses and Re-
store Some Progressivity into the Tax Code, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 581, 606-12 (1992).
48. The taxpayer in Smith case claimed that “but for” the nanny the wife could not go to work
and produce income: “Petitioners would have us apply the ‘but for’ test. They propose that but
for the nurses the wife could not leave her child; but for the freedom so secured she could not
pursue her gainful labors; and but for them there would be no income and no tax.” Smith, 40
B.T.A. at 1038.
49. Id. at 1039. Nevertheless, in Rev. Rul. 73-348 it was ruled that when the corporation pays
for a daycare center, these expenses “are directly related to its business and are, accordingly,
ordinary and necessary business expenses deductible under section 162 of the Code.” Rev. Rul.
73-348, 1973-2 C.B. 31.
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the Kuntz v. Commissioner.50  In this case, a husband operated a busi-
ness and hired a person who both worked for the business from home,
but also served as a caregiver for his diseased wife who needed “some-
one to be with her at all times.”51  Based on Smith, the court held that
the caregiver expenses were not deductible even though they enabled
the husband to work outside the home.
Although courts do not consider child or dependent care as a de-
ductible expense, the law grants a credit for the parent or relative’s
working activity.52  Section 21 grants a progressive credit for the work-
ing individual for his dependent,53 spouse,54 or child up to age 13.55
This should not be confused with the $1000 child tax credit, however,
which is granted to parents whether they work or not,56 for any quali-
fying child under age 17.57
IV. THE PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS DEBATE
Because of the accumulated tax reduction caused by personal ex-
penses, such as child or dependent care and charity contributions,
scholars have long disputed the deductibility of those expenses.58  The
starting point of this discussion is the comprehensive tax base referred
to above.59  In what follows, I introduce some important works on the
personal deductions dilemma.  Stanley S. Surrey, who first conceived
the tax expenditure notion, treats personal deductions as a deviation
from the tax base.  He thus considers personal deductions tax benefits
equivalent to direct expenditures.60
50. Kuntz v. Comm’r, T.C. 2011-52.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. I.R.C. § 21(b)(1)(B) (2012).
54. Id. § 21(b)(1)(C).
55. Id. § 21(b)(1)(A). Some scholars criticize this tax credit since it is not a full credit but still
incentivizes married women to stay at home rather than advance their professional career. See
e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working
Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971–1972).
56. I.R.C. § 24(a). This credit is also a refundable one to help not just middle-class but low-
income families. See I.R.C. § 24(d); see also DANIEL Q. POSIN & DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLES
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 641 (2005).
57. See I.R.C. § 24(c). There is also an adoption credit, see id. § 23, to parents who have final-
ized the adoption process, designed to refund adoption costs, including fees and legal costs. Id.
§23(d)(1).
58. Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
343, 343 (1989).
59. Supra Chapter II.
60. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); Stanley S.
Surrey, Tax Incentives – Conceptual Criteria for Identification and Comparison with Direct Gov-
ernment Expenditures, in TAX INCENTIVES – SYMPOSIUM CONDUCTED BY TAX INSTITUTE OF
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Andrews61 takes a somewhat different approach and recognizes the
existence of an ideal tax base.  He examines the ideal personal income
tax with regard to the taxation of personal deductions.  His starting
point is that income should be defined by its uses and not by its
sources: “an ideal personal income tax is one in which tax burdens are
accurately apportioned to a taxpayer’s aggregate personal consump-
tion and accumulation of real goods and services and claims thereto
— the uses to which income is typically put rather than the sources
from which it is derived.”62  Thus, taxpayers who use their funds as
contributions to charity should be regarded as if they did not own that
money.  However, he rationalizes the deduction of medical expenses
and charitable contributions differently.  For example, his main justifi-
cation for allowing medical expense deductions and excluding them
from the tax base is largely distributional.63
Mark G. Kelman64 challenges Andrews’ use-oriented deduction
concept and bases his theory on net income as the ideal tax base.  If
the ideal tax base should be measured by relative earnings capacity
and if individuals choose not to realize their potential earnings capac-
ity,65 it is, in principle, inequitable to allow the deduction of medical
and charitable expenses.  Kelman and Stanley A. Koppelman66 share
a similar view.  Koppelman argues that since income means the power
to consume most personal expenses, which are not related to income
production, should not be deductible.67  Johnny Rex Buckles, similar
AMERICA, NOVEMBER 20-21, 1969 (1971); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM –
THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES (1985).
61. Andrews, supra note 1. R
62. Id. at 313.
63. Andrews’ distributional justification is as follows:
What is important about money income for tax purposes, Simons’ formulation indi-
cates, is not so much that it reflects one’s participation in the production sector, but that
it determines his participation in the distribution sector. And when we say income is to
be taxed in whatever form received, it is the latter relation, not the former, that we
should seek to refine. If a taxpayer’s contributions in the production sector are more or
less than what he is paid, it really does not matter; he should be taxed on what he is
paid anyway. But if a person’s money income fails to give a fair general measure of his
participation in the distribution of real goods and services, then we must consider how
great the disparity is and whether there are practical ways to adjust for it. Hard policy
problems do not have simple answers.
Andrews, supra note 1, at 324-25. R
64. See Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal”
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979).
65. Id. at 832-33.
66. See Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L.
REV. 679 (1988).
67. Id.
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to other tax-base scholars, justifies the charitable contribution deduc-
tions since he regards it as “community income” rather than an “indi-
vidual income.”68  With regard to personal deductions, Boris I.
Bittker69 criticizes the supporters of the all-inclusive tax base as incon-
sistent.  Some of these scholars agree to exclude some personal expen-
diture from gross income and to deviate from the Haig-Simons
formula.  Bittker believes that their reasoning is similar to the ratio-
nale given in support of all other “exceptions,” or “preferences,” in
the law and that each provision should be examined separately.
In a similar vein, Thomas D. Griffith70 criticizes Surrey’s, Andrews’
and Kelman’s models, since they are lack “a coherent normative prin-
ciple.”71  He addresses personal deductions by examining two distinct
distributive justice principles: a utilitarian one and a variant of Rawl-
sian maximin principles.72  He concludes that under some simplifica-
tions, either medical deduction or credit, can increase social welfare
both under utilitarian and leximin theories.
Jeffrey H. Kahn73 examines four personal nonbusiness deductions
officially – and in his opinion, wrongly – classified as tax expenditures:
medical expenses, theft and casualty losses, charitable contributions,
and the interest deduction for mortgages on a personal residence.  He
reviews both Andrews’ and Kelman’s papers on personal deductions
and supports the former’s conclusion with a different rationalization
by concluding that since those deductions fall in line with progressive
taxation, they should not be characterized as tax expenditures.74
Since two specific “normative” personal deductions are examined
here, it will be useful to review the particular attitudes towards those
expenses in the literature and not just as part of “personal expenses.”
Charitable deductions have received broad support since their enact-
ment in 1917.75  The main three justifications are the measurement,
68. Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions De-
duction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 971-72 (2005).
69. See Bittker, supra note 30, at 950-54. R
70. See Griffith, supra note 58, at 343-45. R
71. Id.
72. Id. at 345.
73. Kahn, supra note 27, at 2.
74. Id. at 6-7. For mixed business and private expenses see also Shaller, supra note 47. The
author analyzes the legal treatment of the following personal expenses: home office deduction,
the deduction allowed for certain travel between home and work, the moving expense deduc-
tion, the exclusion for certain fringe benefits, the deductions for business meals and entertain-
ment, and childcare credit. The author suggests some specific amendments in each personal
expense to accomplish equality in taxation.
75. See e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1393 (1988). Gergen differentiates between various kinds of charitable contributions and
examines them on both efficiency and equity grounds. Not all donations can be justified as pro-
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subsidy, and choice theories.76  Andrews’ measurement theory77 fo-
cuses on the donor and his tax burden, emphasizing that he does not
obtain any material benefit.  The second – subsidy theory – treats
charitable aid as public goods,78 as it is seen to include the two main
attributes of public goods: non-rivalry and non-excludability.79  The
basic idea is that charities offer free public goods to the donees.80
However, while some charities, such as scientific research organiza-
tions, are almost pure public goods, others – such as museums where
visitors can directly pay for their benefit – are less so.81  Be that as it
may, if governments tax those public goods, this will cause underfund-
ing.82  The third main justification for deducting charitable contribu-
tions is based on choice theory.  Choice theory considers the choice
granted to donors as valuable in itself.83  Therefore, the charitable de-
duction is valuable, not just because of its public good merits, but also
because it enables donors to decide which charity they wish to sup-
port.84  The public choice mechanism facilitates the democratic pro-
cess and treats taxpayers as voters and taxes as ballots.85  In that
respect “[t]he [charitable] tax deduction essentially casts the govern-
ment as a financing partner, with taxpayer-donors serving as in-
termediaries or agents who choose the providers of, or indeed the
very existence of, certain services.”86  In this Article, I follow An-
drews’ measurement theory.
moting both efficiency and equity principles. For a more comprehensive discussion on this issue,
see MATTHEW HARDING ET AL., TAXING CHARITY – A LITERATURE REVIEW (2011), http://law
.unimelb.edu.au/centres/cclsr/research/major-research-projects/defining-taxing-and-regulating-
the-not-for-profit-sector-in-australia-law-and-policy-for-the-21st-century/nfp-publications.
76. See Grace Soyon Lee, Mitigating the Effects of an Economic Downturn on Charitable Con-
tributions: Facing the Problem and Contemplating Solutions, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 589,
601 (2013).
77. See Andrews, supra note 1.
78. See e.g., Gergen, supra note 75, at 1394 (aiming to answer the following important ques- R
tions: why should charitable contribution be deducted and exactly what payments and to which
organizations?). For the recognition of contribution deductions Gergen supports both the sub-
sidiary and the equity theories. Id.  Gergen believes that “[m]uch of Andrew’s argument for
allowing deductions for contributions to charity shares a premise with the argument for a deduc-
tion as a subsidy: the fact that charities provide collective goods.” Id. at 1421.
79. Id. at 1397.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1397-98.
82. Id. at 1398.
83. See Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28
TAX L. REV. 37, 61 (1972) who claims “that the deduction can be viewed as a mechanism for
permitting the taxpayer to direct, within modest limits, the social functions to be supported by
his tax payments.” See also Lee, supra note 76, at 606. R
84. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 388 (1998).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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The debate around child-care deductions is also long lasting.87  The
main criticism against the legal treatment of childcare is that it dis-
courages mainly married women with children from working.88  When
housewives stay at home to raise their kids, a non-pecuniary income is
produced, which is untaxed.  This untaxed imputed income induces
many women to stay at home rather than be productive in the tradi-
tional sense by working outside the home.89
V. TAX GOALS AND TAX SYSTEM HARMONIZATION
The question whether to deduct a certain amount is central to the
discussion of “ideal income tax.”  This discussion clarifies that taxa-
tion is not merely “revenue raising.”90  As early as 1934, Robert E.
Cushman alleged that the federal income tax achieves both social and
economic goals91 and that “taxation need not be for revenue only.”92
More recently, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah claimed that tax goals are three-
fold: the first, and obvious, goal is raising revenue to finance public
goods, but there are two more controversial93 goals: redistributive and
regulatory.94  The threefold tax goals will be the premise of the follow-
ing discussion.95
The three objectives of taxation are not necessarily compatible.  For
instance, “revenue-raising” is not correlated with “revenue-affect-
ing.”96  For instance, in order to properly tax income, the law allows
deducting “ordinary and necessary expenses,”97 such as raw materials
87. On its legislative history see, Shaller, supra note 47, at 606–12.
88. See Blumberg, supra note 55.
89. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 42
(1971).
90. See Levmore’s classification between “revenue-raising” and “revenue-affecting.”
Levmore, supra note 84, at 387 n.1. R
91. Robert E. Cushman, Social and Economic Control through Federal Taxation, 18 MINN. L.
REV. 759, 762 (1934).
92. Id. at 764. For the purposes of tax goals see also 2 ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION,
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION: The Use of the Tax System to Achieve
Economic and Social Objectives 1-2 (1996).
93. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 76–77 (2002).  Murphy
& Nagel believe that taxation has mainly two goals – revenue raising and redistribution.
94. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
95. Posner claims:
Taxation in common parlance refers to the use of the powers of the state to extract
money from its subjects in order (1) to defray the cost of services that the politically
dominant elements of the state wish to provide and that the market would not provide
in the desired quantity and at the desired price, or (2) to transfer money from one
group to another, or (3), often, to do both.
Posner, supra note 89, at 28-29. R
96. See Levmore, supra note 84, at 387 n.1.
97. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012); see supra Chapter I.A.
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in the shoe business example above.98  This deduction has nothing to
do with the regulatory goal of taxation.  Nevertheless, in this Article, I
claim that there are few expenses that promote the triple goals of tax-
ation, and that we should support tax deductions that meet all three.99
Those deductions support an ideal coherent and comprehensive tax
system.  When some deductions support just one, which is not revenue
raising, or two goals, however, our tax system is incoherent and
disharmonic.
This discussion bears some similarities to the theory of interpreta-
tion.100  Although, a harmonic system is not a primary goal of a juris-
diction, both legislators and judges endeavor to attain such a
system.101  Interpretation theory treats the statute as “a living organ-
ism,”102 meaning that legislative interpretation should strive for har-
mony between a particular statute and the entire legal system.
Similarly, even a particular legal provision is “a living organism” in a
dynamic environment, and its adjacent surroundings is the law itself.
Before striving to achieve both harmony and consistency at the macro
level, the entire jurisdiction should strive for harmony at the micro
level between the various provisions of the law itself and specifically
its underlying rationales.  If there is no harmony at the micro level, it
cannot be reached at the macro level (a bottom-up argument).  If the
law is designed to promote the fundamental principles of the law sys-
tem, then its components, the statutory provisions, also have to be
harmonized.  In particular, laws must not contradict each other, let
alone various provisions in the same law, or else normative harmony
would remain unattainable.103
Since the federal tax code contains thousands of legal provisions,
many of them are inconsistent and do not fully serve the three tax
goals.  If one aims at attaining legislative harmony, the interpreter
should endeavor to settle legal disagreements in a way that falls in line
98. See supra Chapter I.A.
99. See also Limor Riza, ‘I Have Nourished and Brought Up a Child, and the State Has Re-
belled Against Me’ – Recognition of Child Care Expenses as a Mixed Personal/Business Deduc-
tion Unifying Tax Goals 245, in ESSAYS IN TAX LAW IN HONOR OF ARIE LAPIDOT (David
Gliksberg ed., 2015) (Hebrew).
100. Here, I base my discussion mainly on the extensive research of Prof. Aharon Barak.
Another justification can be found in the coherence theory. See Robert Alexy & Aleksander
Peczenik, The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality, 3 RATIO
JURIS 130 (1990).
101. For the discussion on harmony see, for example, Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L.REV. 19, 76-77, 91, 144 (2002). See also
McCaffery, supra note 17 (supporting a coherent tax interpretation).
102. See Barak, id. at 28.
103. See id. at 35.
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with all three tax goals.  This interpretation may also contribute to
answering the fundamental question: what is income, i.e., whether the
Haig-Simons formula is indeed its proper measure.
VI. CLASSIFYING PERSONAL EXPENSES
A. Altruism
After understanding that tax provisions should fall in line with the
three goals of taxation, it is necessary to classify the private expenses
at stake.  This examination is required to determine whether those ex-
penses fall in line with the three tax goals or whether their deduction
maintains a coherent system.
It should be noted that not every private expense is a normative one
with an altruistic component, as seen in the dentist-flower example
above.104  The common denominator of both types of expenses dis-
cussed here is altruism – helping a person other than the taxpayer.
There are different kinds of altruism, and the term evades a unified
definition.  One distinction that may be directly relevant to the discus-
sion on donations is made by Amartya K. Sen. Sen distinguishes be-
tween donation or behavior motivated by commitment and those
motivated by sympathy.105  But as Mark P. Gergen comments, “[w]e
cannot say with confidence, for example, whether a parent aids a child
for reasons of pleasure or duty.”106
Some scholars focus on the sacrifice and help aspects of altruism.107
Others concentrate on its goal: the altruist is a person who wishes to
increase the other’s welfare.108  Still others rely on economic theories
that focus on the rationality of the action and the utility derived from
it.109
104. See supra Chapter I.B.
105. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 326-29 (1977).  Sen stated,
It can be argued that behavior based on sympathy is in an important sense egoistic, for
one is oneself pleased at others’ pleasure and pained at others’ pain, and the pursuit of
one’s own utility may thus be helped by sympathetic action. It is action based on com-
mitment rather than sympathy which would be non-egoistic in this sense.
Id. at 326.
106. Gergen, supra note 75, at 1433.
107. See e.g., Jacqueline S. Mattis et al., The Social Production of Altruism: Motivations for
Caring Action in a Low-Income Urban Community, 43 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 71, 72
(2009) (citing Samuel P. Oliner, Extraordinary Acts of Ordinary People: Faces of Heroism and
Altruism, in ALTRUISM AND ALTRUISTIC LOVE: SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGION IN DIA-
LOGUE 123 (Stephen G. Post et al. eds., 2002)).
108. See id. (citing C. Daniel Batson, Why Act for the Public Good? Four Answers, 20 PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 603 (1994)).
109. See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATION 3-24 (1984).
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The literature on the motives for helping others is irrelevant, and it
is only the consequences that matter: did the taxpayer’s action actually
benefit the other?  Helping the other can increase one’s utility.  How-
ever, since this utility is impractical to measure,110 the focus of this
section will be on the outcome itself.  Clearly, the two types of ex-
penses in question are altruistic in the sense that they meet the two
requirements of this definition.  First, the altruistic act increases the
other’s welfare, regardless of its motive.  Second, it is considered a
valuable act.  This definition is important to exclude immoral or illegal
acts.
This definition implies that the “other” is any person besides the
taxpayer.  If one donates money to a third party, this is clearly an al-
truistic act.  A question may arise about the consequences of such a
donation if the beneficiary is a relative. Donations to a relative may be
treated as dependent care.  Under § 170(g)(3),111 a relative is defined
as “an individual who, with respect to the taxpayer, bears any of the
relationships described in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of section
152(d)(2)” – namely a child, a sibling or a parent.  But as stated above,
the “other” is anyone, also a relative, other than the taxpayer.  Ac-
cordingly, while some scholars who restrict altruism to almsgiving ex-
clude children from the “other,”112 other theories consider the act of
helping the child as altruistic.113  As stated above, the motive for the
“contribution” is irrelevant – only the outcome is relevant to the
analysis.
In sum, the main characteristic of the “private” expenses in ques-
tion is that they contain a normative aspect of altruism.  The require-
ment is that the expense was carried out to increase the other’s
welfare whereas the “other” is any person except for the taxpayer, the
income-producer.
110. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 75, at 1423-28 (discussing donor’s satisfaction). And see the
claim that “[a]lthough it once had some currency, few scholars today think that we should be
concerned with subjective satisfaction in measuring income.” Id. at 1427 (internal citations
omitted).
111. With regard to “amounts paid to maintain certain students as members of taxpayer’s
household.”  I.R.C. § 170(g) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-254) (effective Dec. 18, 2015).
112. Elias L. Khalil, Adam Smith and Three Theories of Altruism, 67 LOUVAIN ECON. REV.
421 (2001).
113. This perspective relies on evolutionary biology and rational economy theories. Evolu-
tionary biology considers altruism as gene perpetuation thus a child is naturally the “other.”
Rational economy may identify one’s utility with the other’s, but still the other is separate from
the altruist. For evolutionary biology theory see, for example, RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH
GENE (1976); for rational economy see, for example, Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interac-
tions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974) and Gary S. Becker & Robert J. Barro, Altruism and the
Economic Theory of Fertility, 12 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 69 (1986).
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B. Altruistic Act towards Related or Unrelated Party
The various altruistic expenses can be differentiated by the distance
of the relation with the “other.”  This distinction is related to two
linked sub-distinctions: whether this expense is forced or optional, i.e.,
the choice characteristic, and whether the expense is “ordinary and
necessary,” i.e., the mixed business characteristic.114  When a taxpayer
transfers money, not in an arm’s length transaction, in order to nurse
her child and to be able to continue to work, the expense is a coerced
one.  The working mother has no other alternative other than to pay
this expense, even if the choice to go to work is voluntary.  This is not
true with regard to charity donation.  The donor is not coerced to
make the altruistic act to the unrelated party.  In the former case, the
altruistic act is directly related to the income production and thus car-
ries a mixed business characteristic, while the latter has nothing to do
with it.  These distinctions will prove vitally important in examining
the differences between the two types of expenses in question in
Chapter VII.
VII. THE NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF TAX GOALS
A. The Regulatory Aspect
The normative aspects of tax goals are embodied in the redistribu-
tive and regulatory aspects of taxation.  Taxation can enhance desira-
ble behavior by promoting an economic, social or national goal by
virtue of its regulatory mechanism.  Surrey,115 for example, demon-
strates how tax policy is used as a tool to regulate and favor certain
activities or groups.  According to Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, all
deviations from “normal income tax” can be considered as tax ex-
penditures or “special preferences found in every income tax. . . .
often called tax incentives or tax subsidies, [which] are departures
from the normal tax structure and are designed to favor a particular
industry, activity, or class of persons.”116  They may be structured in
different forms, such as deductions, credit, and exemptions,117 but
their common denominator is that they form a “‘normative’ income
tax structure.”118
A common example of using tax as a means to regulate an activity is
the Pigovian tax, which deals with negative externalities and aims at
114. See also Riza, supra note 99, at 261-266.
115. See generally Surrey supra note 60.
116. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 42, at 680.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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inducing tortfeasors to internalize the negative private costs, in order
to produce efficiently.  Naturally, there is disagreement among schol-
ars regarding whether taxation should serve as a regulatory mecha-
nism119 and whether the legislator should use tax expenditure rather
than direct spending.120
Both types of expenses in question here can be justified on regula-
tory grounds – both from social and economic perspectives.  The first
type of expenses is donations to charities.  These donations are the
bread and butter of charities – an umbrella term, used here, to apply
to what is variously called the non-profit sector, social economy, or
the third sector.  All these terms define different aspects: the “non-
profit sector” emphasizes mainly the lack of profit redistribution; the
term “social economy” highlights its socioeconomic aspect; whereas
the “third sector” refers to its position between the market and the
government.121  Non-profit organizations (NPOs) are not a new phe-
nomenon but their numbers and global impact have significantly in-
creased in the last decades.122  If one accepts the importance of NPOs
and acknowledges their contribution both to “social cohesion”123 and
market efficiency,124 then, naturally, a tax relief for donations should
be supported on regulatory grounds.
The same applies to the other type of expense, again relying on
both economic and social grounds.  In many societies, mothers are the
parents who stay at home to raise the children and consequently delay
their career progress for several years.  Now, if women do not get a
tax relief for this non-pecuniary work, the family unit usually makes a
cost-benefit analysis, calculating the costs of hiring a nanny versus the
mother’s income.  In many cases deciding that the mother should stay
at home and raise the children is made simply because it is more eco-
nomical, at least in the short run.125  This is partly a result of not tax-
119. Id.
120. Other scholars believe that in order to examine whether a certain government policy
should be implemented through taxation or not, we should shift from tax to institutional dis-
course. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004).
121. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR IN A
CHANGING ECONOMY 10, 12 (2003), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/
urban-rural-and-regional-development/the-non-profit-sector-in-a-changing-economy_978926419
9545-en#page1.
122. For the reasons of their popularity and significance see id. at 10-14.
123. Id. at 47.
124. See the European experience supporting the social and efficiency grounds of NPOs. Id.
at 47-51.
125. See Baby Blues; A Juggler’s Guide to Having It All, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2011), http://
www.economist.com/node/21539925. The article states,
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ing an imputed income.  Richard A. Posner nicely illustrates the
economic problem of exempting the imputed income of such mothers:
[T]he exemption from income taxation of the real but not pecuniary
income generated by housewives must cause a significant misalloca-
tion of resources by inducing many women to stay at home who
would be more productive in other employments.  The administra-
tive costs of implementing a broader income concept would be so
great, however, that this exemption is probably a permanent feature
of income taxation.126
If those women wish to return to work, they are at a certain disad-
vantage due to the delay in their career progress and are often re-
quired to compromise on a less desirable workplace.  Moreover, by
staying at home, they deny other people an employment opportunity,
leaving potential nannies unemployed.  In that respect, inducing
women to continue working after giving birth is stimulation for the
entire economy.127
It is therefore quite straightforward that tax relief for daycare ex-
penses is economically justified.  In addition, there are perfectly good
societal reasons for supporting it.  From the parents’ perspective, the
benefits are clear-cut and relate mainly to the economic aspect and
women autonomy to decide whether they prefer staying at home and
raising their children or not.  The law should provide women with the
free choice to decide if they wish to work and should not interfere
with such a private, autonomous decision.  It is the child’s perspective
that requires elaboration here.  The duty to support children is both
moral and legal, based on the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child.  Many nations have ratified this Convention and are bound by
its content.128  For our discussion, Article 18 is particularly relevant:
The OECD reckons that across its member countries the net average cost of child care
after allowing for fees, cash benefits and tax concessions is 18% of the average wage,
which makes children seem a bit of a luxury. Child-care arrangements are often a com-
plicated patchwork quilt of paid help, family, friends and neighbours. In some countries
. . . the combined effect of the cost of child care and the lack of tax concessions and
benefits makes it unattractive for mothers of young children to work unless they are
very well paid.
126. Posner, supra note 89, at 42.
127. This claim is relevant mutatis mutandis to dependent care expenses as well. Nevertheless,
one possible claim against the recognition of dependent care deductions is that the dependents
(i.e., people who became dependent during their adult life, that is not born with handicaps)
could have saved for a rainy day so as not to become financially dependent on others. Recogniz-
ing dependent care deductions discourages people from saving for the future. This argument is
inapplicable to the child care expense.
128. The US has signed but not yet ratified the Convention. See Status of United Nations
Treaties UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Home.aspx?clang
=_en (click on the “Depository” tab and select “Status of Treaties” from the drop down menu;
then click on the “Title Search” tab; enter “Convention on the Rights of the Child in the search
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[B]oth parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and
development of the child.  Parents . . . have the primary responsibil-
ity for the upbringing and development of the child.  The best inter-
ests of the child will be their basic concern.  [Governments] shall
render appropriate assistance to parents and legal guardians in the
performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure
the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of
children.129
In the United States, parents have the duty to support and take care
of their children, but the scope of this duty varies between states.130
Although this is not a social science paper, one can find support in
social studies to examine whether it is better from a child’s perspective
to be raised by a nanny rather than by his mother.  Naturally, there
are various studies on the matter.  One study carried out by the Na-
tional Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD)
emphasizes that there is not any developmental difference between
children who were exclusively cared for by their mothers and those
who were cared for by others.131  Thus, the child-care expense can be
justified mainly through the mothers’ lens also on social grounds.
B. The Redistributive Aspect
The relationship between regulation and redistribution is explained
by Posner, who argues, “[O]ne of the functions of regulation is to per-
form distributive and allocative chores usually associated with the tax-
ing or financial branch of government.”132  Although there are diverse
perspectives on distributive justice (egalitarian, utilitarian, etc.), the
discussion here will be limited to a somewhat circular argument and to
Andrews’ view.
It is indeed not consensual that taxation or other legal rules are
suitable for achieving distributional goals.133  Whatever position
field; the first result of the search will be a hyperlink to the convention status; then click on the
first link; once on the page, scroll down to see entry “United States” in the table).
129. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 18, June 26, 1945, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
130. For example, in NY the parents’ duty ends when the child is 18 years old. See N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW art. 1, § 2 (McKinney 2016).
131. See NAT’L INST. OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., THE NICHD STUDY OF EARLY CHILD CARE AND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT:
FINDINGS FOR CHILDREN UP TO AGE 41/2 YEARS (2006), http://www.nichd.nih.gov/publications/
pubs/documents/seccyd_06.pdf.
132. Posner, supra note 89, at 23.
133. See, e.g., Jacob Nussim, Redistribution Mechanisms, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 323 (2007); see
also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should
Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistrib-
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taken, for our purpose it is sufficient to accept that taxation has the
power to serve as a distributive mechanism.  The question of whether
this is the best alternative for redistribution is beyond the scope of this
paper.
A very simple definition of redistribution is the transfer of wealth
from high net worth persons to others.  The taxpayer or transferor
gives part of his income to the transferee.  Altruism, expressed in
“almsgiving” terms, as discussed above, is a clear example of such re-
distribution.  Child-care deduction naturally meets this simple defini-
tion of redistribution.  Bear in mind, though, in that simple sense,
charitable contributions do not always involve transfer from economi-
cally better off persons to worse off persons.134  Only donations to
people in need promote this simple idea of redistribution.
These two kinds of personal expenses are also in line with Andrews’
position that taxation should not focus to such an extent on the in-
come and on the taxpayer’s “participation in the production sec-
tor,”135 but rather on the “distribution sector,”136 given that the tax
system has a distributive goal.137  Thus, the normative aspect of ex-
penses, which are not for self-use, justifies their tax relief since they
also promote distribution goals.
C. Revenue Raising for Public Goods
There is no doubt that the first goal of taxation is revenue-raising to
finance public goods and services.138  However, since Adam Smith, it
is not unconditional.  Over two hundred years ago, Adam Smith sug-
gested four principles necessary for applying a good tax system.
Those principles – still referred to as the canons of taxation – require
that tax should be equal, certain, and efficient, and also take the tax-
uting Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 119-127 (2nd ed. 1989).
134. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 75, at 1398.
135. Andrews, supra note 1, at 324. R
136. Id. Andrews continues: “[a]nd when we say income is to be taxed in whatever form re-
ceived, it is the latter relation, not the former, that we should seek to refine.” Id. For an elabora-
tion see id at 327.
137. Id. at 326.
138. The neoclassical economic approach is that government intervention is needed in case of
market failure. The classical public goods have two characteristics: non-rivalry and non-exclud-
ability. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 644-49 (5th ed.
2001).
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payers’ convenience into account.139  They are commonly accepted to-
day and have since been developed further.140
Equity, in particular, is a widely accepted principle although differ-
ent scholars have conceptualized it differently.141  Two fundamental
principles have been developed to evaluate equity: the benefit princi-
ple and the ability to pay principle.142  The benefit principle treats tax-
ation as a price – taxpayers should pay taxes only on the benefits they
derive from using public goods.143  Ability to pay is the most estab-
lished principle, both in theory and practice.144  According to this
principle, taxes should be levied in accordance with taxpayers’ wellbe-
ing.  As a rule, a well-off taxpayer with a higher ability to pay should
pay more taxes.
Ability to Pay and Expense Deductibility
By applying the ability-to-pay principle of equity, both taxpayers –
the one that contributes to charity and the one who pays for childcare
– are less able to pay than other taxpayers who are not required to
spend these amounts, following Andrews’ line of thinking.145  If we
accept the Haig-Simons formula, how should those expenses be
treated?  Should this payment be treated as a private expense – and
thus as consumption – or rather as part of income production, or a
business expense?  The normative personal expenses in question in-
deed reduce taxpayers’ resources.  In other words, they reduce their
economic ability to choose how much to consume and how much to
save.  This is true for both types of expenses.
Nevertheless, there is still dissimilarity if Andrews’ view is disre-
garded.  Andrews, to some extent, detaches the use side from the in-
come production side.  The ability to pay is indeed lowered in both
cases – whether a taxpayer paid for charity146 or for childcare – but
not for self-consumption.  This is a sufficient condition for Andrews.
If someone transfers some of his income to charity or to childcare,
then indeed he immediately reduces his disposable income for future
139. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 825-28 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1979).
140. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 235 (3rd ed. 1980).
141. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 93, at 12.
142. See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 61-66 (4th ed. 2008).
143. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partner-
ship, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 401-03 (2005).
144. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 93, at 20.
145. For ways to measure the ability to pay see Andrews, supra note 1, at 327. R
146. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 75, at 1426.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-1\DPB103.txt unknown Seq: 22  1-MAY-17 15:23
76 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:55
saving or consumption.  But there is an important distinction between
those expenses which are directly related to the income production
side of the equation and the “alternative” the taxpayer has, which An-
drews did not consider important.147
Ex Ante/Post Expense and Un/Related Party
Both payments – to charity and to childcare – reduce one’s ability
to pay.  Nevertheless, one expense is directly related to income pro-
ducing and is similar to an ex ante expense.  If the parent, usually the
mother,148 does not pay the nanny for taking care of the child, then
she cannot go to work and produce her income.  And when she does
work, when daycare expenses are not deductible, and she continues to
work the same number of hours, she is left with a lower income.  This
result is absurd. Not only does she have to pay the child-care expenses
to be able to work, but she has to support another person with a lower
real income.
On the other hand, the contribution to charity expense is not a pre-
requisite for income production.  The expense to charity is ex post –
after the income has been produced.  This ex-ante/post discussion is
related to the remoteness of the other person, the transferee, in the
altruistic act.  The payment for child or dependent care benefits a re-
lated party, as opposed to contribution to charity,149 and is thus moti-
vated by a much more powerful need. If the parent will not provide
for his child – who will?  But if the person will not donate to the char-
ity – others may still donate.  Moreover, the parents’ payment to
childcare is directly related to income production.
The ex ante/post distinction is fundamental for differentiating be-
tween these two normative expenses,150 despite Andrews’ view.  Natu-
rally, both expenses are relevant for the use side of the equation, but
only the child-care expense is related also to the income production
side.  It is a normative expense that can be normatively discussed from
both the source and use sides of the equation.  It is a personal expense
but at the same time, a business-oriented one, and thus should be re-
garded as “ordinary and necessary.”151
147. For the importance of the income production side see, for example, Koppelman, supra
note 66.
148. See supra Chapter VII.
149. This paper disregards donations to related parties.
150. The ex ante expense is also relevant to many other basic expenses (such as food, accom-
modation etc.) though those expenses lack a normative aspect.
151. See supra Chapter I.A.
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Andrews stresses an expense that is not for personal use should be
deductible since it promotes other distributive goals.152  Clearly, both
expenses in question are normative ones that promote both regulatory
and redistributive goals, but the main difference is that one expense is
detached from income production and the other is not.153  This differ-
ence is related to the traditional definition of mixed business and per-
sonal expense and the comprehensive tax base discussion.  Donation
to charity is a personal expense, but a child-care expense required by
the parent to produce income is a mixed business and personal
expense.
Keeping in mind the dissimilarity of the expenses, should both kinds
be treated the same way?  Child-care expenses are mixed business and
personal expense and should be treated accordingly,154 but charity do-
nations, which only promote regulatory and distributive goals, may be
treated differently since they are irrelevant to income production.  A
certain tax incentive may be appropriate, but perhaps in the form of
credit.
Economically, there is a key difference between a credit and a de-
duction: A credit reduces the tax liability itself, whereas a deduction is
subtracted from the income itself.155  Credits directly reduce the total
tax rate and deductions reduce the taxable income.  If we adopt Sur-
rey’s hypothesis, then a credit is a tax incentive that is “a departure
from normal tax structure,”156 usually granted to help low-income
families avoid eroding their real income157 and to save a certain mini-
mum amount of money for equitable reasons.158  This can be mainly
achieved by refundable credits.159  According to the Haig-Simons
formula, there is no room for credits, but only for business deductions
since they help assess the net income, the change in individual wealth.
A credit may promote other tax goals, such as regulatory and redis-
152. But see Andrews’ argument for deducting childcare expenses: “[T]he reason for allowing
the [childcare] deduction has to do with the working mother’s loss of time to devote to house-
hold tasks as compared with the nonworking mother, which is precisely the kind of household
difference that ought to be taken into account in allocating personal tax burdens.” Andrews,
supra note 1, at 382. R
153. See the above discussion on the Ability to Pay and Expense Deductibility under this
Chapter.
154. This conclusion is relevant to any mixed expenses with an altruistic aspect, such as depen-
dent expenses, and extra payment to a disabled employee, as discussed supra Chapter I.B.
155. See, e.g., POSIN & TOBIN, supra note 56, at 3, 633.
156. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 42, at 680.
157. See, for example, ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION, supra note 92, at 46-47.
158. 3 ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXA-
TION: THE USE OF THE TAX SYSTEM TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES 21
(1966).
159. Id.
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tributive ones, but it does not accurately measure wealth production.
Over the years, policymakers deviated from the Haig-Simons formula
for economic or social goals160 that can be justified on regulatory or
redistributive grounds.  If we adopt a more economic, but still norma-
tive, approach to income, we may say that a child-care expense should
be deductible precisely because it is also business related and thus
promotes all tax goals.  This deduction does not contradict the ideal
income tax even according to the tax expenditure analysis.161  On the
other hand, since charity contribution expenses are tax incentives that
only support the redistributive and regulatory goals but are unrelated
to income production, they should be incentivized by way of credit,
but not deduction.  This recommendation is diametrically opposed to
the applicable law.  As shown above, charity donations are deductible,
whereas child-care expenses are given a credit.
CONCLUSIONS
In this Article, I tried to find a coherent justification for certain ex-
penses that have a normative aspect of altruism, such as charitable
contributions and child-care expenses.  An essential characteristic of
those so-called “private” expenses is the taxpayer’s altruistic behavior.
In other words, the expense was made to benefit another person.  The
methodology was to examine whether those expenses fall in line with
the three goals of taxation: revenue raising, regulatory, and redistribu-
tive goals.  Only expenses that serve all three purposes help maintain
a coherent tax system by synchronizing the comprehensive tax base
theory with its opponents.
One of the criticisms raised against Andrews’ work was that it is
chaotic and lacking in a “coherent normative principle.”162  Our com-
parison of the two types of expenses has shown that by virtue of an
expense’s normative aspect, both expenses meet and promote redistri-
bution and regulatory objectives.  The discussion hitherto is analogous
to Andrews’ argument.  But the difference occurs when we refer to
the first objective, which requires us to tackle the deduction issue
from both sides of the equation – use and source.  I believe that by
focusing on the use side, at the expense of the income production side,
Andrews has missed an important distinction.  Charitable contribu-
tions can be made after the income has been produced, while child-
care expenses are linked to the production of income itself.  This is
160. See the discussion on income supra Chapter II.
161. See supra Chapter IV.
162. See, for example, the discussion surrounding supra Chapter IV.
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because child-care expenses are mixed expenses that carry both busi-
ness and private elements.  Moreover, this direct link between the use
and source is vital to income production since childcare is a coercive
ex ante expense.  Conversely, other normative expenses, which are not
prerequisites for income production, should not necessarily be deduct-
ible and may receive other tax reliefs.  The ex ante and ex post discus-
sion is a fundamental difference between these two normative
expenses, which disregards Andrews’ view.  Thus, child and depen-
dent care expense can be normatively discussed both from the income
production and use side of the equation, as it represents a mixed per-
sonal and business expense, which should thus be regarded as “ordi-
nary and necessary.”163
A mixed expense comprising an altruistic normative component is
an expense that connects the revenue side to its uses and weighs both
the use and source side equally.  This link between the source of in-
come and its uses enables a coherent tax policy to promote the three
goals of taxation at the same time.  Following this analysis, my recom-
mendation is to treat child-care expenses as deductions and charitable
contributions as credits – the exact opposite of applicable law in the
United States.
163. See the discussion in supra Chapter I.A.
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